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ral Histories represent the recollec-
tions and opinions of the person inter-
viewed, and not the official position
of MORS. Omissions and errors in fact are
corrected when possible, but every effort is made
to present the interviewee’s own words.
Dr. Gerald G. ‘‘Jerry’’ Brown is currently
a Distinguished Professor of Operations Re-
search and Executive Director of the Center
for Infrastructure Defense at the Naval Post-
graduate School (NPS), Monterey, Califor-
nia. In 1976 NPS students elected him best
teacher; in 1982 NPS faculty elected him
best researcher; in 2005 he was elected an
Institute for Operations Research and the
Management Sciences (INFORMS) Fellow;
in 2008 he was elected to the National Acad-
emy of Engineering (the first NPS faculty
member to receive this honor); and in 2009
the Secretary of the Navy awarded him
the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service
Medal. Dr. Brown also won the INFORMS
Military Applications Society’s Koopman
Prize in 1990, the MORS Barchi Prize in
2007, and the MORS Clayton Thomas
Award in 2010. This interview was con-
ducted in Jerry’s office at NPS on June 20,
2011. Notes at the end identify Jerry’s cita-
tions, most of which can be downloaded
from his NPS homepage http://faculty.
nps.edu/gbrown/.
MORS ORAL HISTORY
Interview with Dr. Gerald G. Brown
June 20, 2011
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey
Dr. Kirk Yost and Dr. Bob Sheldon, FS,
Interviewers
Bob Sheldon: Jerry, let me first ask you to
give us your parents’ names.
Jerry Brown: My dad’s name is Gerald
Brown. I’m the second. And my mother’s
name was Ruth.
Bob Sheldon: Tell us about your parents
and how they might have influenced you.
What did your dad do for a living?
Jerry Brown: My dad worked at North
American Aviation. He was one of the devel-
opers of the F-86, F-100, A-5, XB-70, X-15,
and the original B-1. Early on, I lived in El
Segundo, California, in a house on the beach
that later was razed to make way for Los
Angeles International Airport (LAX) runway
25. I’ve been involved with our military all
my life.
I lived in Southern California for a while,
but then I was moved around quite a bit be-
cause of family disruptions and so forth. I
spent time in Idaho on a ranch, in Ohio on
a farm, and at Fort Knox, Kentucky.
I went to high school for four years in
Vicenza, Italy, and received what I later ap-
preciated to be a very, very excellent educa-
tion at the Vicenza American High School,
preparing me for university.
Bob Sheldon:Did you get to travel around
Italy while you were there?
Jerry Brown: I traveled all over Europe.
Bob Sheldon: You said you had some re-
ally good teachers; were any of those in
math or science?
Jerry Brown: They were. I had excellent
teachers in mathematics and science, and
in English exposition. I was really blessed.
Kirk Yost: Despite growing up in so many
places, you decided to return to California?
Jerry Brown: I decided to come back and
I’m currently living in Pebble Beach, about
as far from the ocean as I’ve ever lived in
California.
I should admit about my California ed-
ucation that I failed kindergarten in El
Segundo, California, and I assume I’m still
recorded in El Segundo as being ‘‘mentally
challenged’’ or whatever the currently ac-
ceptable euphemism is.
This had to do with a congenital prob-
lem called trigger thumbs that physically
interfered with my speed manipulation of
blocks on an IQ test. This was diagnosed
and surgically corrected. But, in California,
I’m still officially ‘‘mentally challenged’’—
just ask my spouse.
Kirk Yost: How did you decide where to
go to college from Vicenza?
Jerry Brown: I came back from Vicenza
during my senior year so I could get a high
school diploma from a California school
and not have to explain to colleges what
was going on.
I graduated from Fullerton Union High
School in Southern California and had had
such a good preparation in Vicenza that I
was allowed to enroll in the junior college
even though I was still in high school. And
I applied to, I think, about six universities.
I was accepted to a number of schools,
and I ended up going to the University of
California at Berkeley. But that was not a
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Speech Movement and the riots and tear gas
and so forth. And not having a scholarship, I
had to work for a living.
Between the demonstrations and working
at night I had had enough of that in about three
quarters and transferred. I ended up getting two
college degrees from California State University
Fullerton, and then I went to UCLA for my PhD.
Kirk Yost: Both your bachelor’s and master’s
degrees are from Cal State Fullerton?
Jerry Brown: They are. And are you ready for
this? My bachelor’s degree is in business market-
ing (quantitative methods), my master’s degree
is an MBA (quantitative methods), and my PhD
is in management.
Bob Sheldon: I want to ask a question about
perception. There’s often a perception of two-
way snobbery between engineering schools and
business schools. Many folks in the engineering
schools assume that if somebody’s too weak in
their mathematical rigor to survive the engineer-
ing school, they go to the business school. And in
the business schools, there’s a perception that if
a person’s too weak in their personality skills to
survive in the business environment, they go to
the engineering school. Given that you survived
quite well, you excelled in business school and
you are quite rigorous mathematically, what’s
your comment on that?
Jerry Brown: It depends on the business school
and on the engineering school. My recollection
is that if you could understand the Black-Scholes
equation you were no slouch mathematically. If
you talk to a mathematical economist or to some-
one mathematical in finance and so forth, they
don’t have much to apologize for in terms of
mathematical rigor. You need to establish foun-
dations in mathematics and English exposition.
Equipped with these skills, you can do about any-
thing you want. The engineering and business op-
tions you mention just emphasize one or the other,
but cannot (or should not) be attempted with seri-
ous deficiencies in either area.
I’m not a keen fan of undergraduate business
programs. I prefer to see MBA students who
have completed undergraduate studies in some
conventional academic area.
I don’t think there’s any particular weak-
ness on either side here. If you choose a good uni-
versity, a good curriculum, and if you seek rigor
and follow accomplished scholars, you’ll find it.
Kirk Yost:Although all of your degrees are in
management or business administration, your
early publications are on statistics. Did you think
you were going to be a statistician? And how did
you eventually turn to optimization?
Jerry Brown: One of my early mentors was
Herb Rutemiller, and you’ll see his name as a
co-author in some of those papers. He was very
influential, and showed me how to do research
and how to publish. He was a very accomplished
statistician. I followed his lead and got exposed
to the literature of operations research (OR).
But I don’t regret the business degrees because
I can read operating statements and speak the
language, and that’s been useful in consulting.
I had worked for some time at North American
Aviation, Beckman Instruments, and Hughes
Satellites on computers, and so I was lucky to
be an early computer guy when such were still
rare.
I was at that time hired out as a general-pur-
pose, mathematical, and scientific digital pro-
grammer. This was when there weren’t that
many large-scale machines and before the ad-
vent of the current numerical recipes and such.
On my bookshelf here I’ve still got basic refer-
ences like Abramowitz and Stegun with tables
of Bessel functions and the like. It was computer
experience that opened up early research to me,
paid my bills, and also got me working on some
defense problems.
I became interested in optimization while
working with Rutemiller, but also while work-
ing at UCLA with Art Geoffrion, Glenn Graves,
and company. And they’re the ones who really
persuaded me to move from descriptive statis-
tics to prescriptive optimization.
I became besotted with the leverage that
this sort of modeling gave us and I was fortunate
to be involved in some early practical applica-
tions at large scale, including one at RAND Cor-
poration you may remember, Kirk, that helped
the Air Force decide what bombs to buy every
year for two decades (Brown et al. 1994).
Kirk Yost:Can you outline how you went from
Cal State to UCLA and subsequently into the
Navy?
Jerry Brown: When I got my master’s degree
and was accepted into UCLA, I was hired at Cal
State Fullerton as an assistant professor of quan-
titative methods.
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Bob Sheldon: What year was that?
Jerry Brown: 1969. I taught basic OR and com-
puter classes, and the computer classes were
attended by various people from the engineer-
ing school and the sciences because we owned
the biggest, baddest machine on campus (an
IBM 1620 with 20,000 decimal digits of memory).
I noticed a couple of excellent students with real
short haircuts compared to the fashion at the
time.
I eventually learned that they came from an
organization called the Naval Security Group
(NSG). They were taking my computer classes
because I was teaching one of the few sequences
that actually taught programming on a large-
scale computer while also showing how to inte-
grate mathematics to design and implement
useful systems.
And a quarter after that, there were about
six guys with nice haircuts. In parallel to that,
I was having exchanges with my draft board,
and I was single. My draft board was harassing
me, as was their due, and one evening in my
class, one of my short-haired students came up
and introduced himself as a Navy Commander,
and said, ‘‘Do you think you could pass the ap-
titude test for the Navy?’’
I guess I did okay on the aptitude test be-
cause I ended up in basic training at San Diego,
California, to be issued as a freshly minted Sea-
man Recruit E1 with a master’s degree. This was
not too unusual because NSG was pretty fast com-
pany, and the typical commissioned officers and
petty officers had advanced degrees, some of
them with very impressive backgrounds.
In 1969 I got my first top secret clearance
(something I find amusing when I fill out my
forms today because there can’t be anything
they don’t know about me by now) and started
serving with a reserve unit of the NSG.
Then, I contacted my Navy detailer and
said, ‘‘Here’s the deal. I’ve been accepted to UCLA
for their doctoral program. There’s no guaran-
tee of success, but if you give me the time to try
to earn my doctorate there—I don’t want you
to pay for it, and I’ll go on inactive duty with
no pay—when I finish the degree, I might be of
more value to the Navy and at that time I’ll come
back on active duty.’’
Some lieutenant commander in the Penta-
gon concluded this was a good deal, and made
it happen. On graduation, I was supposed to get
a direct commission as a Lieutenant. One thing
led to another, and the Navy got impatient fill-
ing their quotas, and said ‘‘Come join us now,
you’re going to like Newport, Rhode Island, and
you’re going to like Officer Candidate School
(OCS).’’
In fact, I did like both. For me it was a vaca-
tion. I was the oldest guy there at OCS. And in
June, 1973, I was commissioned as an Ensign in
the (regular) United States Navy. I was expecting
to ship out to Vietnam because of some other
background I had with French and earlier work
as a diver doing insurance and salvage work,
and diving for abalone. This meant I could read
navigation charts printed in French. And so my
orders were essentially for the job you saw in
the movie Apocalypse Now.
Kirk Yost: You were going to be a swift boat
commander?
Jerry Brown: Yes, of a Vietnamese river boat
detachment. My detailer really played this up as
‘‘a Lieutenant’s billet.’’
I put my modest affairs in order. Then I got
a call from a guy named Jack Borsting at NPS,
and he said ‘‘According to this IBM card, you’ve
got advanced graduate education. Tell me about
yourself.’’ I explained to him what I had done
and what I was interested in, and he said,
‘‘Would you like to come to Monterey and be
a military instructor?’’ I said, ‘‘Well, let me think
that over.’’ And, as you know, you have to find
somebody else to take your orders in a situation
like this. Otherwise you just can’t step back.
But it turned out there were 30 guys eager to
go over and be heroes, so they had no trouble
filling my billet, and I ended up back in my Cal-
ifornia, and in Monterey.
Kirk Yost: Were you done with your PhD at
that time or were you still working with the peo-
ple at UCLA?
Jerry Brown: I was still working at UCLA.
Kirk Yost: You ended up going to Monterey
as a professor not having finished yet at UCLA?
How did that work?
Jerry Brown: I arrived here as a newly com-
missioned Ensign, and I was made a military
instructor, but because of my publications
and other activities, they gave me an academic
appointment as an assistant professor. They
desperately needed my computer skills, and so
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I was dual-appointed to computer science and
OR and given a double teaching load—a full-
time load in each department.
I had a pilot’s license. That put me within two
hours of UCLA, so I commuted down to UCLA
on Friday and came back Sunday night. After a
year of this, people realized the sorts of research I
was doing were of interest to the Navy, and they
actually cut me some slack and gave me—which
they were supposed to do anyway—a quarter
off. I was able to finish up the degree.
Bob Sheldon: What was your dissertation on?
Jerry Brown: My dissertation was on nonlin-
ear programming used to find maximum likeli-
hood estimates for very difficult distributions
such as the three-parameter Weibull. The moti-
vation was exigent statistical problems, but the
base was developing some rather abstruse non-
linear programming theory.
Kirk Yost: How long were you in uniform at
NPS?
Jerry Brown: Three years. During those years,
I was promoted to associate professor as an En-
sign, then to Lieutenant, Junior Grade (LTJG).
Kirk Yost: Were you the only Ensign to ever
be an academic associate professor at NPS?
Jerry Brown: I think so. My computer science
colleague Gary Kildall was a full Lieutenant. I
was also dead last on the NPS accession list
for 36 months. In other words, for me to have as-
sumed command here, everyone else would’ve
had to be gone.
Bob Sheldon: Let’s back up to your PhD pro-
gram. Any other notable professors that you re-
call from your academic studies?
Jerry Brown: Too many to name. These were
heady times at UCLA in my departments of
mathematics, computer science, and my home
school of management. I also met some very im-
pressive and famous (just ask them) medical re-
searchers. One of the ways I paid my bills was
consulting with the medical school. A medical
school, as you can imagine, has a number of
small-sample statistical puzzles, and their re-
searchers would show up and put a small sam-
ple on my desk and say ‘‘I need to write a
paper about this. What can you prove from this
data?’’
Instead of trying to school them on statistical
propriety, I scoured the literature and developed
a library of the best small-sample tools I could
conjure. This was quite remunerative; it was
good pay for not too much work.
I recall a case where I had to tell a physician
researcher, ‘‘This is just too small a sample size.’’
And he replied, ‘‘Oh, I’ll go get more data.’’
When he came back later, I finally thought to
ask this guy, ‘‘What’s this data about? What
are you measuring?’’
He described a painful procedure that was
being inflicted on unknowing undergraduate
controls who were patients at the UCLA medi-
cal facility. I immediately declared, ‘‘We’ve got
plenty of data. What do you want to prove?’’
I guess the most impressive guy who toler-
ated me at UCLA was Jacob Marschak. He was
a Russian polymath. He was just brilliant. He
wasn’t an optimizer, but he was just so doggone
smart that you’d spend half an hour with him
over a cup of coffee, and he’d end by asking
some question. You’d think that over and it
would occur to you about a week later what
he meant. Sometimes it would take you a month
to prepare for the next cup of coffee, but you
didn’t want to go back into his office again
and be ignorant of what his direction had been.
I am very grateful for having had his ac-
quaintance and it was a great honor a couple
of years ago when I was invited back to UCLA
to give the recurring ‘‘Jacob Marschak Interdis-
ciplinary Colloquium on Mathematics in the
Behavior Sciences’’ (http://www.anderson.ucla.
edu/x1094.xml) with an audience coming from
all over Southern California.
Bob Sheldon: Could you comment a bit more
about your early work in statistics?
Jerry Brown: The initial work we did was in
fixed sample acceptance testing (Brown and
Rutemiller 1971) and in reliability testing that
was required by the U.S. military to monitor pro-
curement quality (Brown and Rutemiller 1973,
1974, 1975). Civilian entities also use these mili-
tary quality controls. There are military specifica-
tions for acceptance tests where you have a lot of
a given number of items, and you sample from
the lot and subject that sample to testing, and
based on the number of successes and failures,
either accept the entire lot or not.
My colleagues and I agreed these were ade-
quate tests statistically. (I believe Jerry Lieberman
at Stanford at the time was one of the most in-
fluential proponents.) But, we felt the tests
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could be unnecessarily expensive in the follow-
ing sense.
If you take a sample, and you begin testing
it, and your results are inordinately successful,
your instincts tell you that you could probably
stop testing, save a lot of money, and make an
early conclusion that things are all right. Con-
versely, if you have early results that are very,
very bad, it might be cheaper to just stop and
back up to try to find the cause.
We did some early work in revising these
military specifications to do sequential sampling
so that we could get better decisions earlier
at less cost. That was my early involvement in
statistics.
Kirk Yost: Where did your extraordinarily
high level of entrepreneurialism come from?
Jerry Brown: I don’t like being hungry. And
it’s part of my background with my family
who were products of the Depression that I’ve
never accepted money from anyone for any-
thing. I never took a dime in scholarship or sup-
port of any type, never had a fellowship, and
never accepted any tuition assistance from the
Navy. And I graduated debt-free with each of
my degrees. I worked in parallel and paid my
bills as they came up.
Bob Sheldon: What were the first courses
they assigned you to teach here at NPS?
Jerry Brown: Basic computer programming
for the masses. Lots of that. Databases, and digi-
tal simulation.
Bob Sheldon: Was that in Fortran?
Jerry Brown: Yes, some of it was in Fortran.
We had a couple of other teaching languages,
and special languages for artificial intelligence,
APL, graphics, list processing, simulation, and
so on, but Fortran was in widest use. It was on
punch cards. We had civil service civilians who
typically had master’s degrees in mathematics
as daytime duty consultants in our computer
center. But, at that time, with punch cards and
batch processing, the only way you could get
your work done was to come in at night. The
students would go home for dinner and then
come back and spend the better part of the night
here, and if you were their instructor, it was a
good idea to do the same.
I ended up spending virtually every night
here with students. Of course, if students know
you’re here and they know you know how things
work, then they come by and ask you questions
even if they’re not your students. I ended up
working on a lot of things like orbital dynamics
and engineering acoustics and learned a great
deal along the way.
Scott Redd recently reminisced as our NPS
graduation speaker about these night shifts with
me, and we laughed with the recollection that I
was neither his advisor (Al Washburn was), nor
second reader; I was just there. And I learned
from working with Scott, and still learn working
with Al.
Kirk Yost: One of your first breakthroughs
in the OR community was the network optimi-
zation paper you wrote with Gordon Bradley
and Glenn Graves. What led you into that area?
Jerry Brown: That actually started on the high
side for me. I consulted for the Joint Strategic Tar-
geting Planning Staff, Omaha. My early classified
work was on planning the Strategic Integrated
Operations Plan, the SIOP, replacing pins and
strings with optimization. You can see how that
leads to the necessity for large-scale network op-
timization given the large number of weapons
we had at the time. I worked with another agency
in the Pentagon reckoning the Red SIOP, or
RISOP.
On the unclassified civilian side, Glenn
Graves had a consulting contract with General
Motors to determine how to distribute automo-
biles to dealerships and customers. And the
combination of those two challenges, plus the
interesting nature of the problem, led Gordon
Bradley and me to spend quite a bit of time and
eventually publish (Bradley et al 1977). We were
offended as scholars that a competing network
solver being published at that time in our open
literature was being sold as a proprietary product
by the authors. We gave away our superior prod-
uct for free and undermined the market.
Kirk Yost:Putting the GNET code in the pub-
lic domain eliminated most of the competition?
Jerry Brown: No, not eliminated. We weren’t
fielding salesmen. We changed the market. These
competitors were using our open scholarly lit-
erature as commercial advertising. And the
sweet part here was our algorithm is actually
much more efficient. To this day, despite a lot
of advances in network optimization, and even
though our network solver is a network simplex
algorithm with a bad theoretical worst-case
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . DR. GERALD G. BROWN
Military Operations Research, V16 N4 2011 Page 61
runtime, in live benchmarks against live data,
it’s still the fastest code.
Kirk Yost: Was Gordon Bradley at NPS when
you arrived, and was he already working in the
networks area?
Jerry Brown: Gordon and I arrived on the
same day in 1973. He had been a tenured asso-
ciate professor at Yale. He had taught optimiza-
tion, doubtless including networks, but I think
the two of us launched off on our network initia-
tive at the same time.
Kirk Yost: Although from radically different
backgrounds, I would suspect.
Jerry Brown: That’s true, and the good for-
tune for me was that Gordon had done a postdoc-
toral fellowship at Stanford with George Dantzig,
and that opened up another set of doors for me.
Gordon was very gracious to introduce me to
George and Phil Wolfe and other people he knew
and who I had not encountered during my odd
career.
Kirk Yost: Up until the 1970s the optimiza-
tion community seemed to be divided between
theoreticians and implementers. You and Gordon
seemed to be at the forefront of people who
worked on both the theory and the coding aspects
of these problems. Can you comment on that?
Jerry Brown:Going back to that era and look-
ing at the literature, you wouldn’t see much that
you would recognize today as an algorithm. Pro-
cedures were described in a rather hand-waving,
imprecise way because we just hadn’t developed
our way of thinking about such things. Theorems
were well-defined, but algorithms not so much.
However, those early literature articles are beau-
tiful to read. If you go back to the earliest issues
of Operations Research and Management Science,
you will find some lovely military OR, really well
thought out and eloquently expressed.
In that era there were a lot of professors who
were well-trained mathematically (recall that
our OR discipline is a descendant of mathemati-
cians and physicists in World War II) who looked
down on those of us who dirtied our hands do-
ing real computer implementation. But, we also
had a parallel discipline in computer science that
was just sorting out things like data structures
and algorithms. The academics who kept to
mathematics vigorously defended their theoret-
ical journals from mere applications. Inevitably,
those of us fortunate enough to have a foot in
OR, computer science, and experience with cut-
ting-edge applications, developed new theory.
One of the offshoots of this for Gordon and
me was that we were two of the three founders
of what is today the INFORMS Computing Soci-
ety (ICS). We founded the Computer Science
Special Interest Group, and Gordon and I served
as two of the three first presidents. The early at-
tendance of our fledgling interest group meet-
ings was helped by me smuggling in cheese,
crackers, and wine. I was told by the poobahs
at the Operations Research Society of America
and the Institute for Management Science at
the time, ‘‘You can’t do that!’’ This evidently vi-
olates contracts with meeting hotels and their
unions. Well, I did it anyway, and guess whose
meetings were standing room only? To this day,
one of the traditions of ICS, and now of other
INFORMS special interests groups, is an infor-
mal cheese, crackers, and wine meeting.
Kirk Yost: Can you talk about one of your
major philosophies, the notion of elastic pro-
gramming? It’s central to much of your work,
but rarely addressed in the mainstream optimi-
zation literature.
Jerry Brown: Some contemporary textbooks
now mention elastic programming. I credit the
original idea to Glenn Graves. I was just quick
to grasp its charm. We were building a large-
scale optimization system from the ground up
at the time, and we developed theory and algo-
rithms with the elastic feature intrinsic. We were
dissatisfied with the commercial products then
and thought we had some better ideas. One of
the difficulties we had was with some standard
benchmark problems, rogue problems that had
been developed precisely because they’re so per-
nicious. We were trying to find ways of solving
them much faster than the competition. And it
turns out that if you can relax constraints you don’t
like, at least temporarily, this is a good thing to do.
One thing led to another and we began to
think, ‘‘You know, this elastic business with lin-
ear penalties is equivalent to bounding the dual
variables, so that more fully defines the model.
You state the model, you specify the constraints
on your courses of action, and along with each
constraint, you specify exactly how important
this constraint is to you. You specify how much,
at most, you’re willing to spend to satisfy this
constraint. That had a rather compelling ring to
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it, and when we looked further, it turns out that if
you implement an algorithm that incorporates
elasticity as a fundamental intrinsic function,
you get some very elegant results, and a very ef-
ficient algorithm.
Kirk Yost: Are you the only practitioner that
has written a code that incorporates those
methods?
Jerry Brown: I don’t know for sure, but I sus-
pect the root node integer enumeration rounding
in CPLEX uses crude penalties. And certainly
many people write elastic models, but they’re
solving them with traditional codes that treat
the elastic variables as explicit logicals—slacks,
artificial, and surpluses—and this is not as effi-
cient as it could be.
Kirk Yost: You’re the only professor I’ve
heard who not only talked about the notion of
elasticity, but talked about it as a fundamental
part of an optimization problem.
Jerry Brown: It’s absolutely fundamental. I
was told by academics early on that elastic con-
straints ‘‘cheat.’’ But, a manager, policy maker,
or a general officer understands immediately
what elastic constraints mean. They can control
what’s going on in a way they understand.
If you like, you can use conventional model-
ing and declare ‘‘all my constraints are immuta-
ble, and infinitely important.’’ Good luck with
that in the real world, and especially in the De-
partment of Defense (DoD), where objectives
and constraints are rather fungible, and where
mere whims by senior policy types become hard
constraints for junior analysts.
Kirk Yost: Another central idea you’ve intro-
duced is the notion of persistence in optimiza-
tion. Do you feel that you’ve made headway
in the community with those ideas?
Jerry Brown: I think in most cases such fea-
tures arise because if a model without any per-
sistence feature gets used repeatedly, say over
time, it’s pretty hard to brief a solution that has
amplified some inconsequential data change
into a wholesale revision of plan, some of which
may have already been promulgated (Brown
et al. 1996). When I find persistence features in
a model, this is a telltale that the model has ac-
tually been used and is not merely some math-
ematical confection.
As you know, Kirk, any model ignorant of
its own past advice is really an ignorant model.
And you’re not going to be able to use an opti-
mization model very long in reality if the model
has no feature to recall and heed decisions that
have already been advised and advertised. That
idea is not yet in textbooks, and that’s too bad
(Brown et al. 1997).
Kirk Yost: Can you talk about your involve-
ment with the Karmarkar algorithm for linear
programming? Its introduction, and the sub-
sequent efforts to control it as a proprietary
method, were very controversial.
Jerry Brown: When we first saw Khachian’s
algorithm, Al Washburn and I took a look at it
computationally and found it to be interesting,
but not very efficient (Brown and Washburn
1980). Certainly the theoretical result—the poly-
nomial worst-case bound on the number of iter-
ations to solve a linear program—was valid, but
not efficiently implementable. Karmarkar’s algo-
rithm was potentially more efficient, although
there are a couple of missing steps in terms of
transitions from the interior points to what we
call basic solutions.
My initial concerns with the Karmarkar re-
sults were twofold.
One was that our open academic literature
was being used (here we go again) to promote
and sell a commercial product and presuming
to publish papers about algorithms that were
patented trade secrets. That is, they successfully
published results without showing how the re-
sults were obtained. This is not science. They also
created a custom-design supercomputer to run
this algorithm and were trying to sell it to major
companies in the United States to solve planning
problems. I believe Delta Airlines bought one.
We were at the same time solving the same
crew scheduling problems for another, larger
U.S. airline, with our own algorithm. These prob-
lems are not linear programs, but rather integer
linear ones. Lacking an integer feature, somehow
you have to deal with fractional crew assign-
ments. You can’t assign half a pilot here and a third
of a flight attendant there; you’ve got to assign
whole people. The Karmarkar implementation
had no integer procedure at all, so I was at the
time wondering what Delta Airlines was doing.
I believe this was a commercial disaster for
the proponents. I don’t think they sold more
than a handful of these, and they only sold those
to people who were rather innocent of what was
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being inflicted on them. Another thing that dis-
turbed me was a presentation by Karmarkar at
Stanford hosted by George Dantzig. A bunch of
numerical results were displayed purporting to
compare the new algorithm against IBM’s MPS
360, at that time a well-regarded commercial-
quality optimizer. Apparently no one else in the
audience knew MPS 360 had a limit on the num-
ber of model constraints. The reported results far
exceeded that limit, and therefore were concocted.
Kirk Yost: Did that eventually get exposed?
Jerry Brown: I exposed it only by asking a
question from the audience, but I don’t recall
that anybody ever retracted a paper or published
a correction or explanation. It’s too bad these in-
terior point methods got off to such a poor start.
Others have independently developed the the-
ory and implementations since, and mated these
with conventional simplicial optimization. For
some problems, this works well.
Kirk Yost: Was there any substantive change
in the community with respect to dividing sci-
entific discovery and marketing products?
Jerry Brown: A few journal editors stepped
up, but generally the Operations Research Soci-
ety of America and The Institute of Management
Sciences, today merged as INFORMS, are pretty
passive in that regard. Despite a case I made as
a plenary address before an annual meeting of
INFORMS, and another plenary address by Seth
Bonder with the same subject, INFORMS still
hasn’t even defined what OR is as a profession.
There are no standards. Anybody can hang
out a shingle. And so they’ve been rather pas-
sive and ineffectual at fencing off behaviors that
you would consider unprofessional. We haven’t
defined what the profession is.
By contrast, the uniformed military services
do have educational skill, degree, and experi-
ence requirements for OR billets—we should
be proud of this.
Kirk Yost: On a different subject, can you talk
about why you chose to stay at NPS as a profes-
sor once you left the active-duty Navy?
Jerry Brown: I thought you’d never ask. I’ve
delivered seminars at many universities, worked
with their students, and remotely advised theses
and dissertations. There’s nothing like teaching
at NPS.
For starters, our students are paid full sal-
aries, with their sole duty to be our students
and to graduate. During tenure here, students
get to catch their breath during a military career.
Nothing the student does here will appear in
a service record or on a fitness report, other than
‘‘attended, and graduated.’’ Imagine that. Many
students who were lackluster undergraduates
return to our graduate program after some time
and experience in uniform, having learned how
to allocate time, effort, and attention, and abso-
lutely bloom as analysts.
I walk into classes on Tuesday, which is uni-
form day here, and the one day a week that the
students don’t wear just business casual attire. I
admire their decorations and qualification in-
signia, and ask myself, ‘‘Where do we find peo-
ple like this? Where do we find people who do
the things these young people do so willingly,
ably, and even heroically?’’
It’s humbling. My students may not have
ever noticed, but out of respect my uniform on
Tuesday includes a tie, and I always begin by
complimenting them on their sharp appear-
ance, and thanking them for their service and
for making me proud.
I think of my thesis student CPT Tom White,
then already having earned two Silver Stars,
whose thesis led to the redesign of our main bat-
tle tank; CDR Mike Mullen [later Admiral and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] (who still
calls me ‘‘Ensign Jerry’’), a section leader, whose
thesis under the Navy’s preeminent tactician
Wayne Hughes presaged the employment of
AEGIS combatant ships with new-generation
phased array radar and interceptor missiles;
LCDR Steve Tisdale, who completed two com-
pletely independent degrees in OR and space
systems, and developed a space junk tracking
algorithm still in use today; and Scott Redd,
who retired as Vice Admiral, and then directed
the formation of our National Counterterrorism
Center. The list goes on and on, and there are
echelons of more junior officers rising. I have
been pleased and proud to see their accomplish-
ments, both in uniform and after.
I also have to express my admiration for our
international students. Although we try our best
to be good hosts, I can’t imagine how hard it is to
move a family to Monterey, get established and
culturally aligned, while at once engaged in
a graduate study program that assumes the stu-
dent is available full-time, without qualification.
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My spouse volunteers teaching English to
international student spouses and family mem-
bers as part of a very important program sup-
ported by NPS and our local school district.
This course involves daily mixing of all interna-
tionals with a master teacher and qualified vol-
unteers. This cultural exchange, in the long term,
may prove as valuable as the academic achieve-
ments of the international students. Our interna-
tional students come from professional upper
classes of their home countries, and the spouses in-
clude very accomplished professionals—doctors,
lawyers, architects, engineers, and so on—who
are not allowed to practice their professions in
the United States while their spouses attend
NPS. (This is, by the way, a nutty U.S. policy.)
We’re spoiled by the fact that when we give
homework to our students, it’s considered or-
ders. And they respond in kind. You have to be
very careful. If you give a bogus homework as-
signment at the end of a week, you may find
out later the students spent all weekend trying
to complete it.
So NPS is a great place to be. There’s noth-
ing like it anywhere else. I wouldn’t trade my
master’s students for PhD students at any uni-
versity anywhere.
The pay is better elsewhere, but we’ve got
all the computers and all the toys you can imag-
ine, and if we come up with some idea involv-
ing blowing something up, firing some rounds,
shooting a missile, dropping some bombs, or
something less kinetic but no less interesting,
we have the means to get such experiments
accomplished.
Kirk Yost: Have you ever been tempted to
leave and assume another position?
Jerry Brown: There have been a number of
occasions, including recently, when I’ve received
unsolicited offers significant enough that I had to
take them up with my spouse. To her credit, she
has advised ‘‘You’re happy at NPS. Don’t worry
about it.’’
Kirk Yost: Can you talk about the commer-
cial consulting you do, and how that compli-
ments your duties at NPS?
Jerry Brown: NPS is a military school, but
administered by scholars. The distinction here
is key. NPS wants me to know everything I need
to know within DoD, at all levels of classifica-
tion, and NPS also wants me to know what’s
going on in civilian industry. They want me to
know what’s going on in the United States and
internationally. They want me to be ready when
called to be able to advise on, and with, the global
state-of-the-art.
NPS encourages us to do commercial con-
sulting on a not-to-interfere basis. We have to file
paperwork with the Judge Advocate General,
and the work can’t involve any client who does
any business with the federal government,
which rules out a lot of organizations, but it has
been a way for us to find out in the private sector
what’s going on with a good portion of the For-
tune 50, if not the Fortune 500.
Kirk Yost: Many senior people in DoD be-
lieve that the commercial sector has better ideas,
and the DoD should be employing them. Given
your significant experience in that world, what
is your opinion?
Jerry Brown: I think the analysts and profes-
sionals I deal with in DoD, including the deci-
sion makers those analysts support, are equal
to anything that you would expect to find in
the private sector, if not better. I’ve never found
a more admirable or harder-working cohort of
professionals.
Of course, there are exceptions in all
organizations.
I have to refer to Carl Builders’ great book,
The Army in the Strategic Planning Process: Who
Shall Bell the Cat? Builder hilariously advises,
with deadly accuracy, that when it comes to
OR, ‘‘God created the Navy and all else fol-
lows.’’ Our Air Force (Brown et al. 2003), Army
(Brown et al. 1991), and Marines (Bausch et al.
1991) embrace OR and use it well, but I admit
my Navy is, well, not as willing a client as I
would wish.
We have had some successes, but the Navy
ratio of success per attempt is not as high as we
wish. Much Navy OR emphasis is on program
planning, because our OR degree sponsor is
OPNAV N81 Assessment Division. However,
even though I always advise following the money,
military OR is about a lot more than just program
planning (Brown et al. 2004, 2005, 2007; Brown
and Carlyle 2008; Newman et al. 2011).
NPS is a joint institution, and this is a good
thing for NPS OR, for DoD OR, and for DoD.
Kirk Yost: Do you think that there are effective
commercial OR methods that DoD isn’t using?
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Jerry Brown: No I don’t. In fact, there are
some fashionable things in industry I’m glad
DoD is not using, for instance, Enterprise Re-
source Planning (Brown 2003). ERP has made
some modest inroads into DoD, but the cost of
these systems is just enormous and for a couple
of applications I have seen that will remain name-
less, the legacy software was better than the ERP
that replaced it. This is a situation where senior
officers and senior executives make decisions
too expensive to fail, and they’re not around
when the implications follow.
Kirk Yost: You don’t think it’s true that pri-
vate industry is quantitatively much smarter
than the DoD?
Jerry Brown: No, I don’t. No private enter-
prise is planning at anywhere near the scale,
the potential consequences, the long planning
horizon, or the myriad exigent scenarios we
are duty-bound to deal with in DoD. Even our
limited NPS OR contributions have been flat-
tered by an external review that assessed our
advice to have influenced more than a trillion
dollars of defense investment.
Whether or not we always have the influ-
ence we seek at the right levels of policy within
DoD, it is structured and organized, and we un-
derstand which levers to pull. So, if people ask
the right questions, and we come up with the
answers, we can at least make a pitch.
I have always felt, even as an Ensign, that I
have had advantaged access and audience any-
where in DoD. I have on occasion exercised that
leverage, and gotten myself invited to talk to
people when I thought there were emergent
problems worthy of our analysis, and to which
we could contribute. I’ve always been granted
an audience. Every time. Sometimes it’s been in-
fluential, and sometimes not.
Unlike civilian corporate bureaucracies,
DoD is much more deeply layered with levels
of authority. But, setting aside whether this or-
ganization depth is necessary, I only care if it
is effective. In my experience, it is.
When you know you’re right, never give up.
Bob Sheldon: Jack Borsting recruited you here
and I’ve done an oral history interview with him.
He’s noted for being one of the founders of the
modern OR curriculum at NPS. Do you have
any comments on the formative years of the OR
curriculum here?
Jerry Brown: I was a latecomer. Current Pro-
fessors Washburn, Gaver, and Schrady predate
me. Jack Borsting, at that time, built a large orga-
nization that was the combined OR and Admin-
istrative Sciences Department. Think of this as
a combined military business school and OR or-
ganization. I forget how many mailboxes there
were, but it was a lot of people.
Jack’s a remarkable guy in the sense that our
organization chart was completely flat. We had
the entire faculty—and we had Jack. Jack was
(and still is) very good at making you feel like
you have a valued opinion, but as he always ad-
vised, ‘‘You all get to vote. But, I get to count the
votes.’’
I would credit Jack with the formation of the
department. He cultivated the connections he
needed. He served in executive positions profes-
sionally, had a good nose for talent, and worked
the phone tirelessly. If he could find some ob-
scure Ensign in Newport, Rhode Island, he could
ferret out talent at Johns Hopkins or Georgia
Tech. He was really remarkable in that respect.
Since Jack, I’ve worked for other chairmen, I
guess a total of eight, and we’ve been fortunate
to have a deep bench and really good leadership
here through some tough times.
The key thing about working here is that
I’m absolutely shielded from the normal politics
that is a preoccupation and distraction at other
universities. I can stay in my office, do my work,
work with my students, work on their theses,
work on research projects, and I don’t have to
worry about any politics at all. Well, except oc-
casionally when we are threatened with a Base
Realignment and Closure action and are asked
‘‘What have you done for us lately?’’ That’s an
easy question to answer, but you never know
if your answer carries any weight in the political
milieu of that epoch.
Bob Sheldon: In your career, you’ve avoided
positions such as department head, dean, and
so on. Yet, you have given considerable support
to professional societies. Can you talk about that?
Jerry Brown: My career is distinguished in
that I have never had a major administrative
position of any kind, and I hope to complete
my career that way. With INFORMS (then the
Operations Research Society of America), my
only contribution work was helping set up the
computer science interest group, and an early
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publication that started as a newsletter and is
now one of their flagship journals.
I’ve done a fair amount of editorial work for
INFORMS, Risk Analysis, and the Military Oper-
ations Research (MOR) journal. I’ve served on
a number of committees. For instance, I re-
cently chaired a committee to choose a new ed-
itor for the journal Management Science. I’ve
served for a three-year cycle and chair for a year
of the INFORMS Fellows selection committee. I
serve on the editorial board for the MOR jour-
nal. I lack administrative ambition. I did chair
the OR PhD committee here for 20 years, and
have been our associate chair for research. I
can’t think of much else I’ve done besides men-
tor junior faculty, advise students, and do re-
search. I could let the National Academy of
Engineering (NAE) become another unpaid
full-time job. Unfortunately, NPS doesn’t have
endowed chairs like other major universities,
so NAE work is ‘‘additional duty.’’
I’m currently serving on a National Research
Council (NRC) Army board on explosives and
survivability, and I’m on the NRC Board of
Mathematical Sciences and their Applications
(BMSA) that sets the agenda in these fields on
what studies will be conducted. I review reports
for the academies, and have the advantage of fa-
cilities to review classified reports without hav-
ing to travel to Washington.
The payback is access via the academies’
legislative affairs office to policymakers. This is
two-way access, and we get calls from them, for
example, the Government Accounting Office and
congressional staffers, with technical questions.
Kirk Yost: Does your future include writing
a textbook, or at least collaborating on one?
Jerry Brown: I don’t think so. I’m having too
much fun doing research. The sorts of work
we’re doing involves groups, sometimes large
groups of people. We’re trying to write seminal
papers that introduce these new things such
as attacker-defender (or defender-attacker, so-
called bi-level optimization) models. For in-
stance, the Bastion paper appearing elsewhere
in this issue optimally merges activities of all
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) platforms, some-
thing never done before (Brown et al. 2011).
We’re trying to write these pieces so they are
theoretically innovative, with exposition of as
good quality as we are permitted within the real
estate we are allowed. Whenever possible, we
provide numerical examples that readers can re-
produce independently. And, we provide our
software free of charge, at least to DoD and its
contractors. Al Washburn maintains a public
homepage full of free software (http://faculty.
nps.edu/awashburn/). These papers are like
mini-textbooks, and they may end up being
chapters in compendia of military OR and/or
civilian OR. It’s just not my nature to sit down
and spend two years of my career writing a book
on completed, past work. I’d be pleased to help
someone else, and I really admire my colleagues
Al Washburn, Moshe Kress, Wayne Hughes, and
others, who are not only scholars of the first mag-
nitude, but skilled wordsmiths who can write
clean first drafts that make sense. I’m a lot slower
than that. A recent paper of ours went through
39 iterations over several months for a single re-
vision, if you can imagine that (Alderson et al.
2011). Writing is hard work for me and takes
a long time. My production rate is slow.
Kirk Yost: I will press you on the textbook
question one more time, because the most im-
portant ideas you teach are not in mainstream
texts.
Jerry Brown: That’s very flattering. But when
I look in the mirror in the morning shaving, I
recognize that I might be able to contribute as
a co-author to such a text, but I’m not likely to
finish a monograph like that.
We have published pieces to fill in what we
view as gaps in textbooks and the open litera-
ture (Brown 1997, Brown and Dell 2007, Brown
and Rosenthal 2008). Kirk, these are full of the
sort of tidbits you seem to have come to value
and can’t find in textbooks. I don’t want to slight
any of my professional colleagues, but those
who have time to write textbooks may not also
have time to gain the sorts of experience that
you were exposed to here in Monterey as a doc-
toral student. It takes a lot of time figuring out
what not to do.
Kirk Yost: Can you talk about the explosion
of improvements in optimization software in
the 1990s, when most people thought it was
a mature field with little left to be exploited?
Jerry Brown: It has been faster hardware,
but more importantly better optimization
methods. I just signed a purchase order for a
16-gigabyte laptop with eight processors. In a
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typical evening at home I use more computer
power than it took us to get to the moon and back.
Kirk Yost: Dr. Robert Bixby, the principal au-
thor of CPLEX, says in his presentations that the
theory was there, but wasn’t being imple-
mented in the products. Do you agree?
Jerry Brown: Yes, I agree with that.
Kirk Yost:Do you think that’s still true today?
Jerry Brown: The main advances in linear pro-
gramming came about because a few researchers
took the time and trouble to build a linear pro-
gram package from scratch. It turns out there’s
a little more involved in doing this than you
might think when you walk out of your first op-
timization class.
Integrating new ideas with a commercial
optimization product is hindered by lack of di-
rect access to internals. Open-source products
such as the Computation Infrastructure for Op-
erations Research (COIN-OR) permit this, but
the overall performance of COIN-OR is uneven.
What you need is a unified design, scrupulously
debugged and tested core routines, and features
purpose-built for your design. Benders’ decom-
position does not work very well as a bolt-on op-
tion, but delivers spectacular performance as
a unified feature. Hundreds of researcher-years
have gone into the development and efficient
implementation of cuts for integer program-
ming. Now we can solve these mixed integer lin-
ear programs at large scale with what 10 years
ago would have been astonishing speed.
Kirk Yost: What’s your philosophy about heu-
ristics, such as genetic algorithms, versus classical
optimization?
Jerry Brown: I have two concerns with these
heuristics. First, as we read too often, ‘‘the com-
putational complexity of this problem means
we have to use a heuristic.’’ More often than
not, there is no reduction proof to support this
defensive complexity speculation. Second, our
business is solving hard problems, on laptops,
in seconds. Using a complexity justification to
justify less sophisticated methods without first
having at least tried traditional mathematical
optimization is, well, disappointing. We have
some very powerful software to try, and when
you don’t even try, you give up a bound on
the achievability of a better solution.
It surprises me that so few people working
on heuristics spend the same amount of time
developing bounds in the objective quality of
their solutions as they do developing better so-
lutions. The developing-better-solutions part is
quite fashionable and the developing of bounds
for those solutions seems to be not quite so fash-
ionable, if not rare. The compelling appeal of
these heuristic techniques is they’re easy to teach,
easy to motivate, and easy to implement. Noth-
ing could be easier than tabu search.
But, I would be very uncomfortable betting
my professional reputation on a PowerPoint
slide based on a too-easy heuristic. I get very
nervous that someone in the audience can get
a qualitatively better solution because I didn’t
do my work with traditional methods or work
very hard at developing an objective bound on
how good my solution is, or could be. I owe my
clients better than that. I need to find out how
much of their money I might be leaving on the
table.
Every year as an anonymous reviewer I en-
counter a few papers immediately adopting
heuristics using the ‘‘we have to do this because
of complexity’’ argument. I customarily ask the
editor to ask the authors to provide their data.
If they refuse to do this, as a scientist (and a re-
viewer) this gives me pause. If they provide the
data, I rummage around my hard drive for some-
thing I might use to try to solve their problem.
You’d be surprised how often a common com-
mercial optimization package can solve these
problems exactly, and much, much faster than
the heuristic proposed.
Kirk Yost: Can you talk about the issue of
getting a planner to pay $7,000 for industrial-
quality optimization software when he’s used
to being issued a spreadsheet for free?
Jerry Brown: The providers of this state-of-
the-art optimization software offer their best
packages free of charge to universities. These
agreements typically require that we credit the
provider when we use their packages on research
and certainly require that if someone walks off
campus with one of these models, they get a
full-up commercial license, which we make sure
they do. In many cases this puts you in a situa-
tion where you can test the software free of
charge during a research phase, and pay for it
only if it works and you decide to use it. We
are a major profit center for these software pro-
viders. Regardless, can you imagine any problem
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that’s worthy of you working on it for even
a week that doesn’t justify a $7,000 software
license?
Kirk Yost: I bring that up often, and fail often,
which is why I’m interested in your views.
Jerry Brown: It’s just nuts. I’ve encountered
folks who think nothing of spending hundreds
of thousands of dollars on analyst labor, yet balk
at buying a single seat with powerful modeling
and optimization tools. Even more ridiculous,
I have periodically heard, ‘‘We’ll save a lot of
money by writing our own modeling and opti-
mization package.’’ Whew.
Kirk Yost: Didn’t you confront this issue
when you worked on routing C-130s around
Iraq, and it became a problem?
Jerry Brown: It was not just the cost, it was
the availability. We had to take to theater a lap-
top with all the software we needed at that time,
and we left it there for the planners at the Com-
bined Air Operations Center (Dell et al. 2006). In
parallel, we developed a heuristic on a toggle,
something we’ve done many times with our
deployed software. We have a toggle on the
dashboard that says ‘‘Do you want an optimal
solution? If you do, you’ve got to spend 7,000
bucks to have the software. Or, do you want a
fast solution and instant gratification and here’s
the fast solution.’’ The Air Tasking and Efficiency
Model (ATEM) has been gifted to Headquarters,
U.S. Air Force, and to U.S. Transportation Com-
mand. You’ll have to ask them how they have
used ATEM to address exigent problems, but I
do observe that some results include email lists
with a lot of names you would recognize.
We provide reach-back in our secret and top
secret laboratories so that planners can tell us
‘‘Listen, things have changed here in theater.
Can you have a look at this to make sure your
fast solution is still as good as we hope it is?’’
We’re keenly aware that, for instance, the opti-
mization software we desperately need to do
optimization-based decision support is not
allowed to be used on Navy Marine Corps Inter-
net (NMCI) computers. I am the custodian for
a number of laptops we’ve bought and loaned
permanently to victims of NMCI. I don’t want
to see my property list of mission-essential gear
we have had to purchase and loan to our ana-
lysts. I know I have personally monogrammed
linens waiting for me at Leavenworth Federal
Prison, but rather than request permission
(which with NMCI these days would take the
better part of forever and more money than I
can muster), I’m counting on forgiveness for
getting the job done.
Kirk Yost: Does anyone in DoD have a ratio-
nal policy for this?
Jerry Brown: Are you talking about the same
folks who have prohibited jump drives, even
though there are absolutely secure ones available?
The Air Force is pretty good, but I think the
Army has perfect pitch. When they send an ana-
lyst to theater, they ask, ‘‘From this checklist,
what do you want on this laptop we’re building
for you?’’ And the analyst deploys with a full-up
round. The poor Marine analyst (or Navy indi-
vidual augmentee) has to find an Army analyst,
or buy his own laptop out of pocket, to actually
get any work done that requires the tools of our
trade. Those defending NMCI seem to view
a computer as an email appliance with a spread-
sheet and slide maker. A computer for an OR
is a tool, a weapon. Denying Navy and Marine
OR’s access to full-up computers is a stupid
and wrong information technology (IT) policy.
I say again, this is a stupid and wrong IT policy.
Have I made myself clear enough?
There’s going to be some debate, but you
can go back to first principles about whether
this NMCI thing has made any sense at all eco-
nomically. At one point NPS was scheduled to
convert to NMCI, and I learned I would have
to donate all our high-end optimization com-
puters (and we have a lot of these in our labs)
and, after some undetermined time for our soft-
ware to be certified at some undetermined cost,
buy them back for a lot of money. I went ballis-
tic, and called in a lot of chips (so to speak). To-
day, NPS is in the .edu domain and not subject
to (but has full communication with) NMCI,
and the argument that saved us that our former
IT director (and NPS MS-OR) Tom Halwachs
made was, ‘‘Who else do you have in the Navy
to tell you what the next NMCI should look
like?’’ Whew. Had we been forced to NMCI, I
don’t think I would still be working here.
Kirk Yost: In the early 2000s, you started
working on two-sided optimization. Can you
talk about how that came to you?
Jerry Brown: I have to credit Distinguished
Professor Kevin Wood for that. Kevin was
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working in the early 1990s with U.S. Central
Command, planning drug interdiction efforts.
One of the early insights he contributed was that
interdicting relatively small quantities of re-
fined drugs is hard, but interdicting 55-gallon
drums of precursor chemicals is much easier.
These travel in canoes on the rivers. He came
up with some models of network flows describ-
ing drug operations and how to interdict these,
and it soon became clear with Special Opera-
tions Forces that the tactics these people were us-
ing were very adaptive. These smugglers were
intelligent and observant. We couldn’t hide our
interdiction efforts and when we did succeed in
snagging a shipment, they just changed their tac-
tics, which led us to ponder, ‘‘Gee, shouldn’t we
model this so that we actually have the adversary
represented in a more realistic way?’’
And then we suffered 9/11, saw the crea-
tion of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the emergence of probabilistic risk
assessment as their recommended way to repre-
sent terrorist threats. In DoD, we plan for adver-
sarial intent (akin to probability assessment) and
for terrorist capability. But we rarely depend
upon intent. That DHS was exclusively relying
on terrorist intent electrified me into action.
In 2007, I was asked to serve on an NRC
committee evaluating the DHS Bioterror Threat
Risk Assessment. DHS produces a report every
two years consisting of a small classified set of
PowerPoints to show to the President indicating,
‘‘Here’s what we’re worried about, and here are
the potential consequences,’’ but backed up by
an enormous technical appendix. Our NRC as-
sessment was not pretty. Even after DHS com-
plained and sequestered our report for many
months ‘‘for security concerns,’’ when it was fi-
nally released, National Public Radio called it
‘‘harshly critical.’’ NRC didn’t find much to like
in overly complex models with obvious mathe-
matical errors, lacking any standard model lex-
icon, and depending on millions of probabilities
guessed by subject matter experts (SMEs) based
on facts not known to science. Unfortunately,
the NRC report was released on ‘‘financial melt-
down day’’ in 2008 (National Research Council
2008). A group from this NRC committee wrote
a paper with a plea for DHS to come to reason
(Brown et al 2008b). Responding to the nuanced
DHS use of the terms probability, likelihood,
propensity, and so on, we also wrote a tongue-
in-cheek paper that should give you a chuckle
(Brown et al. 2008a). These nuances of probabil-
ity terminology are completely bogus.
Probabilistic risk assessment of adversarial
risk is still spreading in DHS and DoD. This is
not a good thing. As Tony Cox and I argue, you
cannot know what a terrorist knows, or will
know in the future (Brown and Cox 2011). You
cannot reckon the probability he will take any
particular action. SMEs do not render consistent
advice between themselves on terrorist intent,
nor do they give the same estimates for the same
conditions on repeated trials. SME estimates
never assess zero (never) or one (always). Yet
an adversary will make a decision that is equiv-
alent to zero, or one, and nothing else. This is not
science, this is voodoo magic.
I have never encountered a ‘‘subject mat-
ter apprentice.’’ Have you? A subject matter
journeyman? These SMEs seem to appear by
self-declaration, and I know of no other stated
qualification.
We view modeling of intelligent, observant
adversaries as a core competency for our stu-
dents. I believe ours is the sole curriculum on
the planet that requires every student to com-
plete an adversarial modeling case study. We
ask them to prepare both sides of the action, at-
tacker and defender, where one opponent has to
move first, anticipating how his adversary will
respond to that move. We’ve got about 11 fac-
ulty researching these topics with our students,
ranging from missile defense to ASW.
You might wonder how ASW becomes a
defender-attacker optimization. A ship is visible
and noisy, and can’t be hidden from an enemy
submarine, which will adjust its evasive track ac-
cordingly. A nuclear attack submarine (SSN) can
search passively, or by active pinging. The latter
gets a better fire solution, but exposes the SSN.
We have added a third level to the sequen-
tial adversarial decisions. Our tri-level model
starts with deciding what to defend, what to for-
tify, what to harden, and so on. We let the bad
guys see this because we can’t hide it. These
are huge commitments that will appear in the
Wall Street Journal. They’ve got cellphone cam-
eras, they can purchase satellite images, and
they can use Google Earth. Once they observe
your defensive preparation, they get to plan
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and carry out their attack(s). Once they attack,
we respond by operating the surviving infra-
structure as best we can.
We have a viable, large-scale, high-fidelity
modeling technique using nested Benders’decom-
position that optimizes this complete decision
portfolio at once, advising the best worst-case
outcome. We’ve demonstrated this, for instance,
working with the Office of the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
America’s Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]),
looking at the resilience of the electrical infra-
structure and how that might influence mission
assurance at places such as Vandenberg Air
Force Base, California. We’ve also demonstrated
it with the roads and bridges of San Francisco
Bay. We’ve looked at many other infrastructures
including about 150 case studies of infrastruc-
tures ranging from gas or oil pipelines, to pro-
tecting meetings of heads of state, to securing
nuclear stockpiles, to traffic systems. We’ve mod-
eled just about everything in terms of critical in-
frastructures, except for banking and finance.
And if we find someone who’s willing to partner
with us and is a domain expert in banking and
finance, which we are not, we’re eager to help.
Kirk Yost: Your work analyzes a range of op-
tions for both sides, but the prevalent method is
to rely on estimates provided by SMEs. Are you
making any headway?
Jerry Brown: We’ve had some success, al-
though we have to separate this out. We’ve got
DoD concerns, DHS ones, and the private sector.
In DoD we have a very apt audience because we
understand what intelligent adversaries are
about and how not to do things and get our-
selves hurt. However, we have not had as much
success as we would like changing the wording
of many DoD guidance documents. We believe
that’s just a matter of time. It’s not an error of
commission that these documents have been
written with unfortunate language; it’s just an
oversight. The typical directive says, for instance,
thou shalt prioritize your targets and begin pros-
ecuting them in decreasing priority until you run
out of resources. We know from just basic knap-
sack problems that you’re not going to get a reli-
ably good plan that way.
We’ve also had an opportunity to demon-
strate this. Our Professor Jeff Kline set up a
benchmark in which we competed ourselves
against a well-known missile defense planning
system. We emulated: find your best defender
first, fix that in position, then find your next-
best defender, fix that, and continue until you
have no more defensive assets to fix. We as-
sume our opponent can detect our defensive
platforms and change his plans accordingly.
AEGIS puts out a lot of radar energy, and termi-
nal defenders such as surface-to-air Patriot
missile batteries are collocated with their de-
fended asset, so you can see them on CNN. The
relative effectiveness of the sequential fixing heu-
ristic for our scenarios was zero—all the attack-
ing missiles leaked through our defenses. Using
the same set of defensive assets and a defender-
attacker optimization, we defended two thirds
of the same defended asset list (Logan 2007).
We’ve had a couple of occasions within DoD
to present these demonstrations, and I think it’s
just a matter of time before these defense guid-
ance documents get reworded.
In DoD, we do plan for enemy intent, which
is the equivalent of probabilistic risk assessment,
right? What’s the bad guy likely to do? But, we
also plan for enemy capabilities, where his courses
of action are limited only by his resources. What’s
the worst thing he can do? We’re better off in DoD
using intent only if we have very good intelligence
and if the planning horizon is very short. Other-
wise, we always use enemy capabilities.
Recalling WWII, we had about the best intel-
ligence you can imagine. We were reading Japa-
nese Admiralty code messages at the same time
their ships were decoding these. And we’d re-
verse-engineered the German Enigma encryp-
tion machine with our Ultra emulation. We had
absolutely wonderful intelligence—for example,
we were sure the Japanese were going to attack
Midway. If Chester Nimitz had acted on enemy
intent, he would’ve pulled our forces out of
Hawaii and far forward, advantageously posi-
tioned to engage the Japanese and defend Mid-
way, but he did not. He held back because he
was cautious that if he deployed our forces,
the Japanese could still attack Hawaii and this
would have been a disaster. He waited until he
had sightings, then he fully committed his ships.
That’s not intent; that’s capability. If you look back
in the annals of military history, I think you’ll
find very few examples of any forces committed
based on planning in terms of enemy intent. Well,
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any good planning. George Custer may have
been an exception.
Let’s move from the DoD across the Potomac
to DHS. Let’s ask a couple basic questions. After
9/11, why didn’t DHS go to DoD to learn how to
plan against intelligent adversaries? Why did
they instead decide to go to National Laborato-
ries? Physicists, of course, can do anything. And,
in 2001, National Laboratories had run out of
work because we aren’t building new nukes,
nor testing them. Our National Labs are hungry,
looking for work. Congress is looking for work
for the National Labs in their districts. DHS is
formed. Congress allocates money to DHS and
says, ‘‘Go hire National Labs and do something
about terrorism.’’ And they did.
So what did the National Labs come up
with? They looked back in the archives and
found ‘‘the Rasmussen Report’’ from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Rasmussen was a pro-
fessor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy who chaired the committee that issued this
report, and it is universally referred to with his
name. The Rasmussen Report in 1975 made the
incredible claim that engineers could predict
the outcome of extremely rare events of high con-
sequence, namely the probability that a light wa-
ter nuclear reactor would suffer some fault that
would cause a casualty leading to a major event.
This got a lot of press at the time, with the prob-
ability of a major nuclear event said to be compa-
rable to ‘‘being hit by a meteor while walking
down the street.’’ Subsequent to the release of
this report, we witnessed the Three Mile Island
event. And then the Chernobyl disaster.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission called
another committee together in 1989 to ‘‘look at
this Rasmussen Report and see what’s wrong.’’
The Rasmussen Report was reviewed intensely.
It was slightly revised and reissued with no sub-
stantive change. The National Labs were well
aware of this Rasmussen Report because it’s
led over the years to what we call today ‘‘prob-
abilistic risk assessment.’’ And they dusted this
off and said, ‘‘Well, clearly this is the way we
should describe terrorists.’’
As a side note, Rasmussen himself warned in
testimony ‘‘One of the basic assumptions in the
(Rasmussen report) is that failures are basically
random in nature (..) In the case of deliberate
human action. such an assumption is surely
not valid.’’ Neither DHS nor its contractors seem
to have noticed this.
What has evolved is a large number of plan-
ning systems funded by DHS and its constituent
Coast Guard that in various ways assess the
possibility (that is, the probability) of various
bad things happening to us. Many of these are
what we call TVC models—a probability that
a terrorist will attack something, ‘‘T’’; a vulnera-
bility to that attack, ‘‘V’’; and ‘‘C,’’ the conse-
quence of that attack typically described either
in fatalities, injuries, or economic costs. These
TVC models have become widespread. Al-
though I had read (and, frankly, dismissed) a
couple of papers on this appearing in the liter-
ature soon after 9/11, I first became aware of the
scope and influence of these TVC models when
I served on the NRC Bioterror committee.
I have already mentioned that our evalua-
tion was ‘‘harshly critical.’’ There have been
other NRC committees formed to study other
systems and, to date, when you bring in scholars
who know something about modeling adversar-
ies, you can expect harsh criticism and wire
brushing of these TVC models. They’re just in-
appropriate.
So, a long answer to a short question: we—
the gang who agrees with me—have not yet
had any discernable influence on DHS, other
than DHS now says they’re aware of our con-
cerns and have addressed all of them. We have
no idea what this means, because they haven’t
asked us for help. These systems still have no
documentation suitable for independent techni-
cal review, and they’re not yet cataloging data es-
sential for substantive systemic analysis. DHS
is very defensive of very large investments on
models based on questionable fundamental as-
sumptions, with answers presumably used to
guide allocation of grants to state and local
agencies.
There are also a lot of boots on the ground
gathering data describing our infrastructure.
That’s a good thing. It’s necessary to know what
your infrastructure is, where it is, and how it oper-
ates. DHS obviously doesn’t want to hear what
we’re trying to tell them. This is unfortunate.
Because you asked, let’s go a little further.
These TVC models are applied to individual com-
ponents of infrastructure, not on infrastructure
systems. But infrastructure systems have function.
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The electric grid has components—transformers,
generators, bus bars, and transmission lines—
but its function is to provide power to its cus-
tomers. It makes no sense at all to apply a TVC
model to individual components if you don’t
know how each component functions as part of
its system. What we have advised is, if you’re go-
ing to plan things about an infrastructure, first
you should understand that infrastructure and
how it works. (Does this sound reasonable to
you?) You may be surprised to find that damage
to or loss of some particular component has no
influence at all on system function.
Another component might also have no in-
fluence at all. But if both these components fail
at once, say the only two exits from the building,
you die. That means you have to understand how
the system functions as a whole. That’s not as easy
as myopic component-wise TVC. But, it turns out
if you look at this as we have, these systems are
managed, or can be, with OR models. If you look
at natural gas distribution systems, they’re con-
trolled by optimization models describing the op-
eration of pipelines, storage facilities, and pumps
(Avery et al 1992). The same thing’s true for crude
oil. The same thing’s true for traffic management
(Alderson et al. 2011). Same thing’s true in virtu-
ally every infrastructure system, where you’ll find
there’s a system operator (or regulator, or eco-
nomic motive) whose job it is to make sure noth-
ing bad happens, to guide infrastructure function,
and perhaps beneficially motivate system users.
For instance, with the electric grid, there’s an
independent system operator (ISO). We’ve talked
with the ISO in California. He has 40 million cus-
tomers and must appear before our legislature
every time some of these customers suffer a
power interruption. He cares very much about
serving his customers reliably and well. He
has some extremely high-resolution engineer-
ing models that are used to continuously advise
how to manage generation and spinning re-
serves to maintain load balance for his 40 million
customers. He controls all of our generating facil-
ities here on the West Coast, and contracts for
power imports. Across our country, every elec-
tric grid has the same sort of ISO manager.
Do these ISOs plan for coordinated attacks by
intelligent terrorists who have studied the basics
of electrical power? No, they don’t. The industry
standard is to plan for a full-up system that
can suffer any single component failed, and in
a limited way maybe any pair of components.
Some of these components are very vulnerable,
remotely located and unguarded, and expensive
to replace. But, they are very, very reliable. Why
worry?
When we discussed this with the California
ISO, we suggested we might be able find small,
simple sets of components whose loss would
have much more drastic effect on his grid than
his engineering models predict. He was, of
course, quite skeptical of that. We pointed to
their operations map in the ISO control room,
and asked, ‘‘what if we take out these two com-
ponents?’’ This got his attention because he real-
ized that it was going to be very dark in a large
part of California for a very long time. And he
said, ‘‘How did you know that?’’ We replied,
‘‘because we have the same model you do,
and we embedded it in an attack planner that
finds the worst case you can respond to.’’
My points are simply these:
1. You cannot predict what a terrorist will do.
You cannot know what he knows, or predict
what he will be thinking in the future. Thus,
you cannot guess what he is going to do.
You can try, and perhaps gain insight by role
playing, but in the end you cannot guess his
‘‘probability’’ (that is, his decision).
2. You cannot assess system vulnerability or
resilience by myopic component-wise anal-
ysis, ala currently fashionable TVC models.
3. You can assess system function. You can
learn how an infrastructure system oper-
ates, its management protocols, and how it
is used by its customers. More important,
you need to model this operation to be able
to reasonably predict how the infrastructure
can respond to any injury to its components.
4. You can assess the level of adversary effort
required to damage or destroy an infra-
structure component. We do this for a living
in DoD, and have cataloged massive data-
bases, for example, joint munitions effec-
tiveness manuals.
5. You can assess, or parametrically evaluate
the amount of adversarial investment (man-
power, money, and so on) required to mount
an attack. We also do this for a living in DoD,
especially in Special Operations.
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6. An operator model can reveal sets of com-
ponents, which might individually be un-
distinguished in any particular way, but
whose simultaneous damage or destruction
has catastrophic consequences.
7. The economic replacement cost of a critical
infrastructure component is irrelevant. If
a damaged or destroyed component is crit-
ical, it will be replaced, regardless of cost.
8. Effective defensive measures for critical na-
tional infrastructure systems are expensive
and will be visible to those who wish to do
us harm. Adversaries will adapt their plans
in response, so we are well-advised to as-
sume they will know about our defensive
preparations when we decide what to do.
9. TVC models have motivated gathering data
about our critical infrastructures, and this
is a good thing. Now we need to go further
and specify how these systems of compo-
nents function, and are managed in the event
of failures or attack.
10. Don’t be fooled by synonyms for the term
probability, used to imply something other
than probability.
We’ve demonstrated how to do such analy-
sis by examples. For instance, we’ve just fin-
ished two student thesis studies by invitation
of the U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port of
Honolulu, one on the operation of the container-
ized cargo imports into Hawaii (de la Cruz
2011), and the other on Hawaii’s import, stor-
age, refining, and distribution of fuel oil and re-
fined products (Ileto 2011). These students met
with the refiners, electric utility, commercial
shippers, and so on. We’re very grateful to the
U.S. Coast Guard for making these officials
available to us to reduce required travel. Each
student built an operator model of his system.
The logistics of containers and fuel is well un-
derstood. Then, they each looked for ways to in-
terdict their system to see what the best
response to the worst case could be. They found
particular sets of components that are extremely
important to the continued function of these
systems, and these systems are vitally impor-
tant to the Hawaiian Islands.
We hope these case studies, and many
others like them, will eventually have influence
at DHS.
And, by the way, before the DoD readers of
this snicker, I am sorry to report that TVC
models have bled from DHS over into DoD.
For instance, I have seen one example dealing
with vulnerability of Navy shore facilities. All
the criticism and warnings above apply equally
here.
Tony Cox shows by simple numerical exam-
ples that you can get, using these TVC models,
not only the wrong answer, but the reverse of
the priorities you should be using (Cox 2008). As-
suming the terms are statistically independent,
which defies common sense, leads you to grief.
For instance, if V increases significantly, you
would expect this to influence T, wouldn’t you?
(As I teach all my students, the independence
assumption can get you killed! The most stunning
DoD case I recall was a model of an integrated
enemy air defense system that assumed inde-
pendence between all radar returns.)
But I do understand how my containers are
handled. I do understand how my refinery is
run (with a linear program). I do understand
how oil and gas are transported (with linear
programs).
The electric grid is also controlled, in real
time, by optimization models. I want to use
things that I do understand such as how the sys-
tem operator responds to casualties and mis-
chief. How does he keep the system running?
How does he plan this?
That I understand. And I do understand how
terrorist and military actions take place. We’ve
got the Al-Qaida training manuals. We’ve got
intelligence. We train Special Operations Forces
to do the same things to our enemies. We have
manuals, unclassified manuals, on explosives
and demolition. We know how many people it
takes, and exactly where and how to take down
the Golden Gate Bridge. We know this because
a student Red Team showed us how. The sort
of modeling that we’re doing (bi-level, or tri-
level) we feel is based on things that we do
know or should know.
I don’t want to guess what an adversary is
thinking. I can’t. I care about defending my
country, our society, and our way of life from
the worst-case thing that could possibly happen
to our infrastructure. If I can do that, I may also
make that infrastructure more resilient against
engineering failures and Mother Nature.
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Finally, let’s move to the private sector. Con-
gress, in its infinite wisdom, passed and extended
the Terrorist Risk Insurance Act, indemnifying
private sector organizations from losses inflicted
by terrorist actions in excess of private insurance
coverage. Business has responded reasonably
enough by doing almost nothing except per-
haps naming a Director of Corporate Continuity
and establishing a back-up data center. They’re
whistling in the dark.
Kirk Yost: When do you think the two-sided
methods will become mainstream OR topics?
Jerry Brown: The tutorial we wrote on this
is the most highly cited one in the history of
INFORMS, so something good is happening
(Brown et al. 2005).
Kirk Yost: Can you talk about two unpleas-
ant areas where optimization was heavily used,
the financial crisis of 2008 and challenge of mod-
ern air travel?
Jerry Brown: Serving on the NRC BMSA
board, I’ve learned more than I ever wanted to
know about our monetary, financial, and invest-
ment systems. We took testimony from Treasury
officials, from major investment banks, from
traders, and so on. Days of this.
There are some very sophisticated models
being used for trading, including trading deriv-
atives and other exotic investments. I don’t think
this was a failure of modeling. These are smart
people and they’re influential. This was an egre-
gious failure of investment institutions and Fed-
eral regulation. It was also a failure in the sense
that people motivated by making a lot of money
put a lot of lipstick on a lot of pigs, and got away
with it, and to this day haven’t been brought to
the dock. But we haven’t found any generally
agreed mathematical smoking gun. BMSA found
a couple of topics that NRC might look at if Con-
gress asks. I don’t anticipate any Federal regula-
tor will ask. But, these topics do not include
stochastic modeling or the underlying optimiza-
tions still being used by, for instance, portfolio
managers.
Kirk Yost: You did not see errors in the port-
folio models that probably were all sourced in
the OR literature, I would think.
Jerry Brown: Not as much of that appears in
literature as you might think. That’s considered to
be a proprietary advantage by the people who are
paying the bills. I have met some ex-students
whose suits cost more than my first car. This is
a sophisticated business.
We have people on the BMSA panel who are
experienced, very senior, very accomplished
economists—for instance, mathematicians and
modelers, Wall Street types—and they would’ve
been on this like a cat if they thought something
had been done incorrectly.
Kirk Yost: One of your colleagues wrote an
article that noted optimization seeks extreme
solutions. Airline travel nowadays is extreme
in the sense that the airlines have downsized
to the minimal possible size airplanes, minimal
possible seat spacing, and so on. And I was
wondering what you have to say about that.
Jerry Brown: That’s a result of deregulation
and Adam Smith’s hidden hand. This is happen-
ing because the market will bear it. If people are
willing to pay more money to travel in greater
comfort, there’ll be more such seats available.
We have a mass market that wants to pay
the minimum possible to get from City A to City
B, and is willing to put up with a few hours of
discomfort to do it. If you work for the govern-
ment, like me, you’re expected to use the cheap-
est, lowest-class service available to this mass
market, so your last-minute travel will be in
the last available seat that doesn’t recline in
the back middle of the five-across seats. Just suf-
fer with it.
My advice for U.S. airlines, if they want to
save a lot of money, is to dissect their proforma
labor contracts with their pilots and cabin atten-
dants. Over years, the sheer length of these con-
tracts has grown to far exceed the impressive
volume of Federal Aviation Regulations. There
are reasonable credits for working at night, lay-
overs, and so forth. However, letting your flight
crews live wherever they want and fly (often at
no cost) an arbitrary distance and time to get to
their official domicile to begin a duty period
needs adult intervention. The Federal Aviation
Administration is looking into crew fatigue as
a result of this. Let’s cross our fingers that the
National Transportation Safety Board doesn’t
have to join this hunt after another incident.
Any industry that lets its high-paid execu-
tives work for the first part of each month
for a specified number of hours, then take the
rest of the month off, partitioning such labor re-
cords in strict monthly buckets, needs its head
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examined. And that’s exactly what we have in
the U.S. airlines these days.
Bob Sheldon: You have a lot of former stu-
dents who will be reading this oral history, as
well as current and future students who will
be reading it. Any comments you would make
to them about their profession?
Jerry Brown: I have enormous respect and
admiration for our students, and I am grateful
to have had the opportunity to work with these
amazing people.
I am trying to make a few changes here at
NPS. I want our local junior college to staff and
teach a basic English exposition class for us.
American secondary education has collapsed,
and even some inputs we’re getting from the
service academies have managed to keep it a se-
cret from themselves and others that they can’t
compose a complete paragraph in English. We
finally confront this here when it comes time
to review the mandatory MS-OR thesis draft.
Whew. That’s too late. We need to screen early
in our curriculum and help these junior officers
get squared away.
This can’t happen to you as an OR. OR is
about describing a problem back to the client
so the client declares, ‘‘Yes, that’s what I meant
to say.’’ Exposition is all, and clarity of exposi-
tion is a symptom and a concomitant with clar-
ity of thinking. These are innocent victims, but
they really, really need to take a remedial ‘‘bone-
head’’ English exposition class until they can
pass a test writing a complete, clear paragraph.
I’ve also advised a number of my students
and colleagues to participate in Toastmasters,
as I have done. This is a very effective way to in-
vest one lunch hour a week learning how to im-
prove verbal exposition. It can be a lot of fun, and
it works. Our junior officer students who have
not yet discovered their exposition problems
are soon going to be the go-to experts when they
graduate. They’re going to be expected to write
point papers for Monday briefs about material
that gets dropped on their desk at 1700 on Friday
afternoon, and they can expect to be appointed to
make presentations to senior executives. They
need to know how to speak. They need to know
body language. They need to know when not to
put their hands in their pockets, how to dress,
how to face an audience, moderate voice, and
conduct themselves. This is an important part
of our profession. This is an important part of
our education here, and I want to enhance this.
I’m pleased that MORS has prizes for ex-
pository excellence, both written and verbal,
and I encourage MORS to continue that. It’s im-
portant. MORS and NPS OR have the MORS-
Tisdale competition among members of each
MS graduating class, started by Rick Rosenthal,
who named it for his late student Steven Tisdale.
This is our most important single award, de-
cided by an expository competition in front of
an audience of all students and faculty, includ-
ing senior executives invited for the occasion.
The winner is judged to be the best exposition
of the best analysis.
Kirk Yost: Rick Rosenthal did a lot to bring
optimization tools to the masses. Could you com-
ment on Rick’s contribution to optimization in-
struction at NPS?
Jerry Brown: Rick introduced us to optimiza-
tion modeling languages, in particular, to GAMS
(http://www.gams.com). This reduced the ef-
fort to build a new model from days to minutes.
Rick had boundless enthusiasm for teaching
students and mentoring young scholars, and
many readers of this will recall his charm and
warmth (Bausch et al. 1991, Brown et al. 2007,
Newman et al. 2011, Brown and Dell 2007, Naval
Research Logistics 2011).
Kirk Yost: I have heard that the classified ver-
sion ofMOR was your idea. Is that true, and how
is it coming?
Jerry Brown: That is true. NPS Professor
Robert ‘‘Bob’’ Koyak is the editor (rakoyak@nps.
edu). The MORS National Security Operations Re-
search journal is now in operation. I believe this is
going to be put out as an electronic paper that’s
on a push from SIPRNet. This is currently the
only way we should be publishing real stuff
while we still have our boots in theater. We
would like to be able to publish for the consump-
tion of others within the MORS community some
of the things we’ve done over there, and we can’t.
We also think we have a lot to learn from others.
The only opportunity we have had is to give and
listen to talks at our MORS meetings, and that’s
not as satisfying or instructive as having a com-
plete archival document.
Bob Sheldon: Is it natural to take some of those
classified papers and sanitize them and make
them unclassified or does that prove too difficult?
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Jerry Brown: We’re not a classifying author-
ity here. And, how do you ‘‘sanitize’’ an idea?
Of course this stuff is secret. It involves protect-
ing our personnel and making them more po-
tent. Once we’re out of there, it might be
reasonable to go back and make a case, ‘‘Okay,
here’s what we’ve done, and how it worked.
What part of this is operationally still a matter
of some sensitivity, and what part of this is
now so routine and well-known we can publish
it and make our taxpayers proud of us?’’
Bob Sheldon: Anything else from you, Kirk?
Jerry Brown: Kirk, you never asked me the
hardest problem I ever solved.
Kirk Yost: Everything you work on looks
hard to me. But I will ask the question, what is
the hardest problem you ever solved?
Jerry Brown: It was at UCLA. A guy handed
me an x-ray crystallography problem. And I
worked on that for about five months. I just
rediscovered my notes here a couple weeks ago.
I don’t even understand my own notes any-
more. But the x-ray crystallography problem is
fascinating. It’s what we now call reverse opti-
mization. What you have is a bunch of digital
evidence of what the answer is, and you seek
the question most likely leading to that answer.
To this day, I have to admit that was the hardest
thing I’ve ever done.
Kirk Yost: Are you satisfied with the prog-
ress you made on it?
Jerry Brown: Yes, we made good progress,
and now there’s a whole area in physics that
studies this, and quite a bit more theory, proba-
bly beyond my ken. There are a lot of related
areas in microscopy and things like optical iden-
tification of fingerprints, eye prints, facial recog-
nition, and so forth. It’s fascinating stuff. I’m
glad we have smart guys who can work on it.
Kirk Yost: In your view, what is OR and why
should we care?
Jerry Brown: Fundamentally, OR is about
discovering simplicity in complexity; discover-
ing clarity in confusion. Let me read to you
how Mike Mullen put it well during his inter-
view with INFORMS (Horner 2010):
‘‘One of the great things that the graduate education
in OR taught me was how to think much more crit-
ically than I had before, and really, to frame a prob-
lem,. And where that really helps me in this job is
being able to still frame a problem in mymind and to
look at it differently than many people who bring
those problems to me.’’
And then I have an opportunity to ask the right
questions. . It’s become a pretty natural part of
how I do business:. the ability to frame a problem
. and then ask hard questions that push the system
in a direction of an answer that clearly wasn’t forth-
coming by the time it got to me.’’
People most frequently come to us, espe-
cially in military OR, not because they want to,
but because they feel they ought to, or have to.
They’re typically faced with complex problems
and feel for whatever reason—either our reputa-
tions from prior successes, or just sheer hope—
that somehow we might be able to help with
these problems.
If you look at the way we do help, you will
find a common pattern for success—one not de-
scribed in any textbook or manual. And I think
these standard things help explain why our
graduates have been so successful in senior pol-
icy positions.
The first thing we’re trained to do is to de-
fine and use a standard lexicon, and we employ
that language carefully. We then use that lexicon
to write down in our native language, in our
case English, but in any native language, write
down our understanding of what the problem
is (Brown 2004). That’s step 1:
1. What is the problem?
We usually write two versions of this. We
write one version that is the executive version,
suitable for a general officer without such train-
ing as ours to read, and to understand. And an-
other aimed at our OR colleagues.
I’ve also advised to have someone who is
untrained in OR read your problem description
back to you. A spouse will work. If, when they’re
reading this back to you, they hesitate or stop
and look up at you, or they need terms defined
that they don’t understand, such as ‘‘algorithm’’
(this term is the third rail of such descriptions),
then you need to edit and rewrite.
Next, you have to decide:
2. Is this problem important?
In government we can sometimes get in-
volved in studies about differences that can’t
make a difference. The earlier you conclude
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . DR. GERALD G. BROWN
Military Operations Research, V16 N4 2011 Page 77
you are engaged with a problem not worth solv-
ing, the better. This conclusion shows how you
finish your problem description, because the po-
tential client who owns the problem has to recog-
nize this. If the potential client just wants to use
your imprimatur to burnish some routine deci-
sion, it’s up to you whether to cooperate.
Next, you have to find out:
3. How will this problem be solved without
your help?
It turns out tribal wisdom can be pretty ef-
fective, especially in DoD where people have
risked much to learn how to solve problems,
and how not to solve them. Here, it is wise to ac-
tually visit the operations center, office, com-
mand, or wherever these decisions are made.
A personal visit and interview of participants
can be most enlightening. It reveals the tone of
the organization, the level of sophistication of
participants, and, perhaps most important, the
willingness to actually participate. No matter
how much senior officers and management
may admire some nifty possible new improve-
ment, if their subordinates aren’t convinced, in-
centivized, and on board, you are dead in the
water.
I’m keen on looking for any post-it notes,
handwritten spiral binders, or other paper refer-
ence materials—these are probably not on any
computer system and very likely contain gems
of wisdom. I’m also aware that a phone call
can beat a clever decision support system every
time, because such a call can relax a requirement,
modify a mission, change an objective, and so on.
You can’t get a sense from afar of whether such
horse trading is used. When we take our problem
description back to the people who brought the
problem to us, and if they read that description
and say, ‘‘Yes, that’s what we meant to say,’’
that’s a good sign we’re making progress.
(I’ll bet a number of MOR readers have ex-
perienced some technical briefing, when the au-
dience starts to get lost, and all turn to the sole
known OR in the room for clarification. Does
this ring a bell?)
Surprisingly, this is the successful end of
many engagements. Having merely clarified
the problem statement, sorted out distractors,
stated what courses of action are available, and
examined current practice, you may be finished.
For example, I have been asked more than once
to schedule the Navy’s fleet of executive air-
craft. After due diligence, I have always con-
cluded this is not worth the effort. On-call
demands and shifting priorities with no likely
way to forecast these makes an operations cen-
ter whiteboard a pretty effective tool for visibil-
ity and decision making. And, besides, my
understanding is that any ‘‘scheduled’’ air trans-
port is the exclusive business of our Air Force.
Nah.
If we decide to continue, the real fun begins.
We may get to do some preliminary mathemat-
ical modeling. But, regardless, we next have to
plan, design, and formally commit to answer:
4. What do you propose to do?
This is the meat and potatoes of our profes-
sion, but we have to hesitate to jump to this stage
before passing all prior qualifications. And, a key
corollary question we must answer up front is:
5. How will we all know when you have suc-
ceeded, or failed?
Remember, OR is (or should be) science.
Throughout, our mantra is, ‘‘if it’s not written
down, it never happened.’’ PowerPoints can
help, but never substitute for writing. These
writings are the key step in design before
you do anything else. This brings us to the last
step:
6. Is the documentation of your success suffi-
cient for external professional and technical
review?
I have encountered important decision sup-
port systems in DHS and DoD, notably recent
ones using probabilistic risk assessment for in-
telligent adversaries, that are documented ex-
clusively by PowerPoints, if at all. And, even
these scant materials are held in confidence.
(Not classified, just held back.) This is shameful.
If I am asked to evaluate such a system, you can
expect strenuous objection. On occasion, I have
determined that the lack of documentation is an
unambiguous telltale that the proponents don’t
know what they’re doing. This is dangerous.
These six guidelines suggest for either side
of the table how to structure, engage, manage,
and conduct a defense contract involving OR.
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An operations researcher should be prepared to
seamlessly and comfortably transition from the
verbal description of the problem to the mathe-
matical description of the problem to perhaps
any modeling that’s required to address the
problem, and especially be effective in ex-
plaining ‘‘the what’’ and more importantly
‘‘the why’’ of the results that you get from such
modeling.
Kirk Yost: You’ve been elected to the National
Academy of Engineering (NAE), the first NPS
faculty member to receive such an honor, and
most military operations researchers don’t fol-
low the activities of that organization. Can you
explain why that should be important to us?
Jerry Brown: The National Academy of Sci-
ences was created by President Lincoln in
1863, during the Civil War, to seek help from ci-
vilian engineers and scientists to advise the
Union on issues that were vital to the conduct
of the war. For instance, ‘‘is metal cladding of
naval ship wooden hulls worth the time and
expense?’’ The NAE was created a hundred
years later in 1964 as a sister organization,
not so much devoted to the pure sciences as to
the new engineering sciences such as (today)
aerospace, bioengineering, chemical, civil, com-
puter science, electronics, operations (that’s
us), materials, mechanical, and earth resources
engineering.
I learned of my election by the members of
NAE via a cellphone call from my chairman at
the time, Jim Eagle, while standing in line with
Jeff Kline at Dulles, waiting to board the first
of flights home from Washington. Jeff and I were
seated separately in the lousy coach seats we are
required to occupy, and we had completed our
mission, save writing a report we could not do
in public. A cabin attendant showed up with a
cold beer from Jeff. Thanks, Jeff—best beer I
ever enjoyed.
The mission of the NAE is to objectively ad-
vise on questions about technology and policy.
There are currently about a dozen members
who have contributed directly to military oper-
ations research. Among us, for instance, the
late Seth Bonder, Peter Cherry, Don Gaver, Dave
Maddox, Bill Perry, Steve Pollock, Steve Robinson,
Larry Stone, and Al Washburn. Typically, NAE
gets involved with the National Academy of Sci-
ences and the Institutes of Medicine, the three
sister organizations, through the NRC, which is
the coordinating organization. The NRC’s fore-
most frequent client is the U.S. Congress, with
DoD a close second. Studies are commissioned
to advise on technological questions that bear
on emergent policy issues.
In such a case, NRC will form a committee
typically numbering a dozen or more, composed
of members of the Academies as well as aca-
demics, scholars, and other domain experts. A
committee will meet maybe four to six times,
take testimony for a day or two at a time from
experts, and deliberate (either with a press gal-
lery, or in closed session). Between meetings,
members have homework to do, correspond ex-
tensively, and plan with NRC staff who arranges
invitations for the next meeting. Eventually, the
committee writes a ‘‘consensus report,’’ which
is anonymously reviewed by about 10 reviewers
and an editor, reviewed with the client organi-
zation or the subject of the study, as directed,
and then released to the public (http://www.
nationalacademies.org/publications/). All this
is aimed to respond to, inform, and advise leg-
islators and administration officials our best
advice. The idea is to influence policy, and, in some
cases—you always have to follow the money—
change appropriations.
NRC also manages studies boards for the
uniformed services.
Bob Sheldon: A distinction between theoreti-
cians and practitioners. For the field of optimi-
zation there are people who do theoretical
optimization, and there are people who solve
real-world problems. Sometimes it’s viewed as
a dichotomy, but you seem to embrace both of
those; you’re both a practitioner and a theoreti-
cian. Could you comment on that?
Jerry Brown: Both are essential. You need to
try to develop and maintain deep roots, and es-
pecially be open to new ideas. Sometimes it
takes a while to really internalize which of all
these new theoretical results can be put together
with other results and have some consequence.
On the other hand, having some actual practice
with real-world problems gives you instincts
about where you need to apply yourself theoret-
ically, and what will work and what won’t. I
have no particular bias about pure theoreticians
or pure practitioners except to say that I lament
the fact that pure theoreticians don’t at least
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have some real experience to help shape their
thinking and their instincts.
And pure practitioners can get in trouble if
they don’t understand the underpinnings of the
tools they’re using. We see embarrassing evi-
dence of these extremes all the time. So there
is a middle ground. I admit I’ve always written
papers with as few theorems as possible. If
you’re absolutely forced to write a theorem to
justify what you’re doing, then maybe that’s
a new result. If you’re writing theorems just to
pepper a paper with them, then you’re just fool-
ing yourself. Most such theorems I see could
have, instead, pointed to prior ones.
Bob Sheldon: Offline we were talking about
your experience flying while you were in New-
port, and I think some people will be interested
if you care to relate that.
Jerry Brown: It’s a story of how sometimes
when you get involved in military and Navy
regulations, funny things happen, and there’s
nothing you can do about it. I was an officer can-
didate at Newport and the Navy and Marines
were quite desperate for aviators. At that time
if you could pass an aviation physical and had
20/20 vision, they encouraged you so strongly
you might say they coerced you into taking avi-
ation familiarization training. I was put on a bus
to a local airport, introduced to an instructor pi-
lot, and we took off for our initial familiarization
flight over Narragansett Bay. My instructor
started me with some basic maneuvers. This
went well, so we quickly progressed to stalls,
departure stalls, spins, hood work, unusual atti-
tudes, and he finally asked me to land. Taxiing
back to the ramp, he declared, ‘‘You’re a ringer.
You already know how to fly. What are you do-
ing here?’’ I replied, ‘‘Because they told me I
should be here, so here I am.’’
We both revealed all to OCS. We were en-
couraged to continue my aviation familiariza-
tion, so my delighted flight instructor and I
had a lot of fun with aerobatics, and will neither
confirm, nor deny, regularly enjoying apple pie
and a cup of coffee on Martha’s Vineyard.
Bob Sheldon: Anything else that you care to
relate?
Jerry Brown: We are most grateful for sus-
taining pure research support from the Air
Force Office of Scientific Research, and the Of-
fice of Naval Research. This enables us to para-
chute in to problem situations on short notice.
(NPS has no mission funding for research—a
fact that surprises folks seeking our help.)
Most of all, I’m grateful to my loving and
trusting spouse who knows how much I love
this job. She understands and appreciates the
consequences of our work, and tolerates the
long hours and those occasions when I have
to disappear without prior warning or later
explanation.
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